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ABSTRACT. The question of whether there are laws of nature in ecology 
has developed substantially in the last 20 years. Many have attempted to 
rehabilitate ecology’s lawlike status through establishing that ecology pos-
sesses laws that robustly appear across many different ecological systems. 
I argue that there is still something missing, which explains why so many 
have been skeptical of ecology’s lawlike status. Community ecology has 
struggled to establish what I call a General Unificatory Theory (GUT). 
The lack of a GUT causes problems for explanation as there are no guide-
lines for how to integrate the lower- level mathematical and causal models 
into a larger theory of how ecological assemblages are formed. I turn to a 
promising modern attempt to provide a unified higher- level explanation 
in ecology, presented by ecologist Mark Vellend, and advocate for philo-
sophical engagement with its prospects for aiding ecological explanation.
[T]he case for laws in ecology is generally thought to be weaker, 
since ecology lacks a grand, widely-accepted, explanatory theory 
such as Darwinian evolution. 
— Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003, 651
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1. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether there are laws of nature in ecology has developed substan-
tially in the last 20 years (Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003; Ginzburg and Colyvan 2004; 
Lange 2005; Linquist 2015). There is a new focus on the robust and resili ent gen-
eralizations that ecological science produces (Linquist et al. 2016). This is a posi-
tive development, opening new avenues for identifying causal relations that can 
be implemented in practical responses to the global environmental crisis. Despite 
these developments I contend that there is more to say on questions of whether 
there are ecological laws of nature. The flood of skepticism toward laws of nature 
in the 1990s was built around the failure of general theories that applied widely 
to community ecology (Lawton 1999; Peters 1991; Shrader- Frechette and McCoy 
1993). It had become apparent that many of the top- down general theories of eco-
logical composition rarely applied to actual ecological systems, which fueled skepti-
cism toward ecology’s status as a science. This skepticism was coupled with a strong 
belief that local explanatory models and predictions were insightful. Nonetheless, 
the lack of general theory, I argue, still causes problems for explanation in ecology 
as there are no guidelines for how to integrate the local mathematical and causal 
models into a larger theory about the way ecological assemblages are formed. 
 This concern could be described through the language of Philip Kitcher’s uni-
ficationism (Kitcher 1981). Successful scientific theories, according to unification-
ists, have an argument pattern built from a schematic sentence, which can derive 
descriptions of many distinct empirical phenomena. The satisfaction of the unifi-
cationist urge to explain a large set of phenomena, in one type of schema, is part of 
the worry I am describing but not quite it. Unificationism is often coupled with a 
winner- take- all problem in which the most unificatory theory is the most explana-
tory (Woodward 2017). This I reject. The major developments in the philosophical 
literature on scientific explanation over the last 20 years have been based around 
local explanatory models, be these interventionist causation, mechanisms, or mod-
els (Batterman and Rice 2014; Craver 2007; Weisberg 2013; Woodward 2005). All 
of these do not aim solely to unify a large number of phenomena but instead focus 
on, and trade between, other explanatory virtues including accuracy and precision. 
I contend that it is critical for a science to have both higher- level explanations, that 
are unificatory and general, and lower- level explanations, which are precise as they 
contain more detail in their description of the phenomena and predictive power. 
 Ecology lacks explanatory integration in the sense that there is no general 
and unificatory theory, a General Unificatory Theory (GUT). A GUT is general 
in that it can apply to many distinct actual systems but also unificatory in that it 
can apply to much of the sciences target explanandum, often in an imprecise way. 
These broad and slightly imprecise theories are critical as they provide a structure 
into which we can place lower- level less unificatory theories. Lower- level theo-
ries explain details of the phenomena the GUT does not but remains silent on 
the larger system explained by the GUT. What I contend is that without a GUT, 
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the science is impeded because the lower- level piecemeal theories are left as free- 
floating unrelated inferences, and there needs to be a higher- level comprehensive 
theory to guide how these theories relate. 
 Community ecology’s many, well- supported, but piecemeal explanatory mod-
els have been unable to be related through the framework provided by a GUT. The 
relationship between ‘local’ model explanation and ‘global’ theories is described 
by Andrew Wayne as explanatory integration (Wayne 2018). Global theories have 
explanatory power independent from the local models as they unify phenomena 
and provide a schematic to derive predictions from initial conditions. These pre-
dictions are often highly idealized and difficult to implement to actual systems but 
provide a broad picture of the way different empirical phenomena relate within a sci-
ence. Local theories are much more precise and implementable. They can describe 
actual instances of natural phenomena in detailed and predictively accurate ways. 
 Within Wayne’s terminology an explanation is either global or local. This distinc-
tion, however, does not fully capture the dimensionality of how laws apply, which is 
why I have altered my terminology to less elegant ‘lower- level’ and ‘GUT’. Laws can 
be general but not unificatory. General explanations apply to many different systems, 
despite changing local background conditions. Unificatory explanation, as I am using 
it, applies to the entirety of the sciences target explanadum; it acts to unify the dif-
ferent explanations of different parts of the target system. Think of the way natural 
selection provides explanatory power to so much of biological phenomena. In com-
munity ecology, the entire target system is the local ecological community, so our 
explanadum is the compositional identity of that community. Why do the species 
that exist in that community appear there and what causes their abundance? A uni-
fying and general explanation is one that is explanatory for the entirety of local eco-
logical communities, for many communities. It should provide some information 
about all the populations that appear within these local communities even if highly 
idealized. Given this conception of explanation, explanations for some feature, in 
many communities, is not a unifying explanation for community ecology. 
 If one is to agree with Wayne (2018), there is an important project of map-
ping the relationship between local theories, what I am calling lower- level theo-
ries, and the mutual supporting and organizing global theories (GUTs). This is 
done through a series of abstractions, idealizations, and counterfactual reasoning 
(p. 352). I will not address the details of this ‘mapping’ relationships project but 
wish to look at the issue of not having any suitable higher- level theory to orga-
nize and relate lower- level explanations. In ecology, we have many successful local 
theories, but we lack an organizing global theory of ecological composition— the 
distribution, identity, and abundance of species in a local ecological community— 
and this ultimately undermines ecology’s lawlike status. 
 I read the history of skepticism toward laws in ecology through this prism. 
The fear of ecology’s lawlessness was always focused around the lack of a unifying 
global theory that could explain ecological composition. In the following section, 
I turn to modern replies to the laws debate and show how they provide accurate 
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lower- level explanations. Then in section 3, I attempt to characterize why lower- 
level ecological explanations are disunified and why this hinders explanation. 
Finally, I turn to a modern attempt to provide a unified higher- level explanation 
in ecology and advocate for philosophical engagement in its prospects for aiding 
ecological explanation.
2. INVARIANCE IN ECOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
The laws of nature debates in ecology have largely focused on the role of invari-
ance in explanations. A common interpretation of laws of nature has them exist 
as invariant and universal generalizations (Smart 1959; 1963). Anxiety about the 
existence of laws of nature has largely subsided through relaxing of the condi-
tions under which a scientific generalization qualifies as a law, permitting laws 
which are not perfectly universal or invariant. Accordingly, ecology has found 
itself possessing laws through these relaxed standards (Cooper 1998; Colyvan and 
Ginzburg 2003; Lange 2005; Linquist et al. 2016). These relaxed standards, of what 
counts as a law, have been perceived as a reply to skeptics of general laws in ecol-
ogy (e.g., Lawton 1999; Peters 1991; Shrader- Frechette and McCoy 1990, 1993). 
I pay attention to the work of Stefan Linquist (2015; Linquist et al. 2016), who has 
developed a comprehensive recent assessment of the prospect of laws in ecology.
 Through the 1980s and 1990s there was a growing disillusionment with ecol-
ogy’s ability to be a successful science. Some targeted ecology’s inability to make 
accurate predictions, leading them to describe it as a ‘soft science’ akin to sociology 
rather than the rest of biology (Peters 1991). Ecology’s lawlessness appeared particu-
larly acute in community ecology, where many practicing ecologists feared there 
were no lawlike generalizations (Brown 1995; Ricklefs 1987; Roughgarden 1989). 
Two exemplars of the skepticism toward ecological laws were John Lawton (1999), 
who argued against the existence of ‘general laws’ in ecology, and Kirsten Shrader- 
Frechette and Earl McCoy (1993), who argued that ‘top- down’ explanation, using 
general theories, fails in ecology and instead explanation should be built ‘bottom 
up’ from case studies. Both are skeptical of what I would consider GUTs of eco-
logical communities, which aim to explain widely the demographic features of an 
ecological community in an area. Theories like niche theory, assemble rules, or the 
diversity stability hypothesis all aimed to describe broad demographic trends in a 
community. It is to these theories that skepticism toward laws was directed rather 
than local mathematical and causal laws, which both at times appear to affirm.1 
 1. For example: Shrader- Frechette and McCoy state “despite the problems with general ecologi-
cal theory, there are numerous lower- level theories in ecology that provide reliable predictions” 
(1993, 120). Lawton states “contingency is manageable at a relatively simple level of ecological 
organisation (for example the population dynamics of single and small numbers of species)” 
(1999, 177).
PhilosophicalTopics47-1_i-iv_1-238.indd   128 9/11/20   10:11 AM
129
 In the years since there has been a defense of laws, stating that there are widely 
applicable laws in ecology even if they are not universal. Some interpret critics 
like John Lawton (1999) as requiring ecological laws have universal and invariant 
generalizations (e.g., Roughgarden 2009). Given this perspective no ecological law 
would qualify, and we should reasonably reject this high standard for law- hood. 
The responses developed to skeptics of laws in ecology have a firm basis in the 
philosophical literature. There is a long history, in philosophy of science, of argu-
ing that laws of nature can be contingent, and exception ridden (Cartwright 1983). 
Accepting ecology as full of contingent ceteris paribis ridden laws was argued early. 
Greg Cooper (1998) held that in ecology, just as in the rest of biology, univer-
sality is not a reasonable standard to hold laws to. Instead law status should be 
derived from the range of different contexts the law holds over; the more contexts, 
the more law- like it is. This move was in line with several suggestions aiming to 
weaken the conditions under which a natural pattern qualifies as a law (Mitchell 
2000; Skyrms 1980; Woodward 1997). Contingency was astutely treated as a quan-
tity that came in degrees, rather than a binary presence. Degrees of contingency, 
the extent to which a phenomenon is robust to changes in background conditions, 
is of the utmost interest to science. This intellectual shift provided opportunities 
for ecology’s contingent generalities to become lawful.
 It is within this space, of identifying degrees of invariance, that we find import-
ant replies to the earlier criticisms of the possibility of ecological laws. Linquist 
(2015) argues that ecology is rich with causal relations, which are invariant across 
a range of background conditions, and applies the conceptual apparatus of James 
Woodward (2005) to defend the existence of laws in ecology. Degrees of invariance 
can be explicated utilizing the work on causation and laws Woodward developed 
(1997; 2005). Causation is understood as a relationship between two variables X 
and Y, if there is a systematic intervention on variable X to change its value and this 
results in a change in the value of variable Y, then Y causally depends on X. These 
causal relations are always within a context of background conditions (B). Water 
boils at 100° C in many different conditions, but in some conditions it doesn’t. For 
example, variation in the degree of air pressure or percentage of salt present can 
change the value of the target variable. A causal relation can be ‘stable’ or ‘contin-
gent’ given the degree to which the causal dependency is found across a range of 
background conditions.
 A similar defense of the existence of contingent laws can be found in Mark 
Colyvan and Lev Ginzburg, who, among others, argued there are imperfectly instan-
tiated mathematical laws (Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003; Ginzburg and Colyvan 2004; 
Turchin 2001).2 Lawton also accepts these as laws (1999, 177). Prime  candidates of 
 2. A reviewer questions if such laws are laws of mathematics rather than laws of ecology. I do not 
make such divisions. The gas laws are laws of gasses as much as they are laws of mathematics. 
Causal laws are laws of the target variables as much as they are instantiations of the metaphysics 
of causation. Following Lange (2005), what makes a law a law of a particular science is the expla-
nandum under consideration.
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mathematical laws of ecology being the logistical growth of populations or allome-
tries, like the Kleiber allometry, which states that an animal’s basal metabolic rate 
is ¾ of its body mass. These laws are mathematical and statistical generalizations 
that apply widely in nature. They are subject to contingency; changes in initial con-
ditions can alter the presence of such patterns. For example, population growth is 
not logistical when there are disturbing factors (see Kingsland 1985 on the histori-
cal debates on population growth). 
 Ecological laws appear to apply across multiple different system types, such 
as different habitats or temperatures. A law can be robust in the face of setting a 
background variable to different values or variation in the variable itself. The abil-
ity of a generalization to survive changes in the background variables is described 
by Linquist et al. 2016 as resilience and they describe three different categories of 
variation in background variables. They describe resilience in the face of varia-
tion in the species the generalization holds over (taxonomically resilient), variation 
in habitats (habitat resilient), and variation in the scale (spatially resilient)3. Then 
using meta- analyses of multiple ecological studies, they identify laws that have 
such resilient generalizations. They identified generalizations in community, eco-
system, and population ecology. These included: habitat fragmentation negatively 
affects pollination, herbivore removal increases primary producer biomass, and 
invasive species increase pools of stored nitrogen. 
 These generalizations are very different to the generalization of niche theory, 
assemble rules, or the stability- diversity hypothesis. They are significantly more 
constrained in their scope. The target variables are not area and species diver-
sity, or total resource consumption, which can then be used to describe the entire 
community species count or identity. Instead these variables are aimed at units of 
investigation like pollinators or invasive species, parts of the ecological commu-
nity. These are crucial explanandum but are not the sort of variables act to describe 
broad features of a local community. These replies are correct in establishing there 
are resilient laws. Precise lower- level explanatory models in ecology are well sup-
ported and quite general in that they apply to many systems under a range of 
background conditions. But these resilient lower- level laws do not establish the 
presence of top- down GUTs in community ecology.
 Many of the replies to ecology law skeptics have involved showing the range 
of conditions a generalization is maintained over, but this has not affirmed a role 
for general and unificatory theories about what determines the distribution and 
 3. I have found this description of resilience rather counterintuitive. For example, take the following 
generalization: warmer temperature increases species X predation success. The target variables 
are temperature and the predation success of a species. Both these variables take a range of values. 
Linquist et al.’s 2016 notion of resilience would have this resilient if it was generalizable over many 
species, but this is not a background condition, it is a change in the target variable. Resilience, as 
I would consider it, would involve varying not the temperature or species, the target variable, but 
other background conditions like the habitat type this taxon was present in to see whether the 
relationship held. But my focus here is on other issues rather than what variables are background 
conditions in causal explanation.
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abundance of organisms in a community. Some may consider this an acceptable 
position for ecological science. We could have many different robust lower- level 
theories and models without a larger theory of ecological composition. In the next 
two sections, I turn to characterizing the problems with solely having lower- level 
generalizations and elaborate a promising recent attempt in the ecological litera-
ture to provide a GUT of ecological communities.
3. GUT- LESS SCIENCE4
Local ecological communities have robust local causal structures that generalize 
across multiple instances. The contents of these ‘laws’ are, however, extremely dis-
junctive. They describe different kinds, patterns, and processes, rarely in ways that 
easily relate to the contents of other laws. The purpose of a general theory in a sci-
ence is to structure the predictions of lower- level laws so that they can ultimately 
relate their predictions to each other. The robust generalizations need to speak to 
the larger scientific field they belong to. Without general theories, these lower- 
level explanations often only provide information about their local explanandum, 
and they struggle to inform explanandum which fall outside the local model. A 
general scientific theory informs how a local model relates to other explanadum 
across their science.
 The disunity of lower- level laws can be observed from their drastically dif-
ferent variables (Vellend 2016). Consider two of the laws of nature identified by 
Linquist et al. (2016) for community ecology, “The removal of herbivores increases 
the biomass of primary producers” and “The impact of grazers on prey biomass 
decreases in proportion to species richness of prey communities” (Table 2, p. 11). 
The variables in just these two rules include a count of herbivores, a quantity bio-
mass of primary producers, a quantity of prey biomass, a count of prey species 
types. Both biomass and counts of individuals are used. Generally, this is because 
defining individual organisms for many species, particularly plants, is extremely 
difficult so ecologists tend to use biomass for organic types that they cannot easily 
individuate. As such, sets of organic types are bifurcated into continuous or discrete 
measures. Distinguishing organic types is extremely difficult in ecology. We have 
herbivores, prey, grazers, primary producers, and species. These different taxono-
mies for organic types include classical biological taxonomy, species, but also sev-
eral different ways to carve up food chains and functional actions in a community.
 While plenty of sciences involve many unique variables, for example chem-
istry involves a large number of individual chemicals, what differs in ecology is 
the lack of theory guiding the description of these variables. Chemical kinds have 
an explanatory framework by which they are divided, their atomic number. This 
 4. Please do not interpret this as inflammatory. There was an opportunity for a pun, so I took it.
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acts to structure the inferences made about these different variables and combina-
tions made from them. There is a GUT that structures the variables and provides 
a way to relate the variables. Ecological variables are built up from many unique 
local models and frameworks, which impede this ability to relate explanations in 
one lower- level theory to another. But how do GUT act to organize the inferences 
made through lower- level theories?
 Prominent general theories in other sciences are evolutionary theory, the stan-
dard model of particle physics, or the general theory of relativity (Wayne 2018). 
All these theories act to structure the lower- level models within their respective 
sciences. Wayne (2018) uses the example of R. A. Fisher’s sex ratio model, which 
identifies an equilibrium dynamic resulting in a 1:1 sex ratio. This local model 
shows the sex ratio, like many biological phenomena, is subject to stabilizing selec-
tion. Stabilizing selection can be taken as evidence for very different conclusions. 
The sex ratio model can be taken as evidence for creationism; many different 
changes to mating strategies will gravitate toward this stable ratio. As such, there 
is a preordained structure in nature, 1:1 ratio sexually reproducing species, which 
is resistant to changes. The impact of this model on the science of biology is much 
different when it is embedded in the theory of evolution. The meaning of the local 
model, the sex ratio model, to the scientific field, biology, is structured by the gen-
eral theory, evolutionary theory. 
 Sex ratios will be robust across multiple different biological systems, it is a 
resilient feature across biology. Without the more general unificatory model of 
natural selection there is no indication of why this generalization holds in some 
cases and not others.5 Exceptions exist to sex ratios and it is the larger theory of 
natural selection that provides us with the framework to understand why. When a 
lower- level model is embedded in a network of more general models we are given 
a guide to why the law applies. It is not enough to simply have a theory be robust in 
local instances, we want to know why it is robust under the background conditions 
it is. This is what general unification theories provide, guidance on when a model 
should apply to a target system.
 Applying this to the case at hand, consider two laws as proposed by philoso-
phers of ecology, Kleiber allometries, and “the impact of grazers on prey bio-
mass decreases in proportion to species richness of prey communities” (Colyvan 
and Ginzburg 2003; Linquist et al. 2016). Kleiber allometries are found widely in 
nature but it remains extremely unclear as to why they hold. There is an explana-
tory gap, which if they were placed in a larger theory we would be in a much better 
epistemic position to answer. As of yet, they stand as a generalization without clear 
reason as to why they are general. This is similar to Kepler’s laws in astrophysics; 
they are extremely robust and widely found but it was unclear as to why they apply 
without a more unificatory law like Newtonian Gravity.6 Equally, “the impact of 
 5. Thanks to Stefan Linquist for a helpful discussion on this point.
 6. Thanks to Mark Colyvan for bringing up this analogy. 
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grazers on prey biomass decreases in proportion to species richness of prey com-
munities” involves very specific sets of populations; why does this theory only 
apply to grazers and not carnivores or insectivores and why is the law- like relation 
quarantined to this set of causal variables and why not form a law- like relation-
ship with the larger set of species that interact in this community? While we can 
hypothesize why this is the case, a more unificatory theory would provide clear 
guidance as to why rather than requiring much secondary hypothesizing. 
 The exemplar of a GUT in community ecology was niche theory (Elton 1927; 
Hutchinson 1957; Macarthur 1958; Macarthur and Levins 1967). Niche theory 
acted to integrate a whole large set of observations and generalizations into a single 
framework allowing for their comparison. Describing an organism’s niche involved 
providing a profile of the resources it used. In doing this, ecologists could identify 
resource overlaps and resources over which populations competed. Resource con-
sumption could then be placed within a food web to identify which populations 
consumed each other and influenced the larger resource cycle. Ultimately, this 
connected both the biotic dynamics of food web and competition with abiotic 
resource cycling, providing a comprehensive picture of ecological communities. 
The focus on competition in niche theory allowed for ecological dynamics to be 
continuous with evolutionary theory, as competition is considered a major driver 
of adaptive variation. Niche theory was an elegant global theory, which comprehen-
sively explained ecological phenomena at the local community level and the role 
of community ecology in the biological sciences. Due to its comprehensiveness, 
the lower- level models of ecology could be incorporated into the niche theory 
framework. With niche theory losing its centrality to ecology through the 1980s and 
1990s there was a lack of organizing grand theories in ecology (but see Chase and 
Leibold 2003 for a defense of niche theory). 
 The failure of the GUTs proposed in ecology, particularly niche theory, had 
and has a real impact on ecology. Global theories provide an explanatory blueprint 
for how the lower- level variables are related. Without this explanatory structure 
we are faced with a series of problems, which I now elaborate. First, there is the 
Tower of Babel problem. There is an immense set of redundant, and worse, par-
tially redundant variables described in scientific laws. The partial co- descriptive 
nature of these variables causes problems for when we try to represent their causal 
influence on each other, this I describe as the (Partial) Partitioning of Causes 
problem. The third issue I want to raise is the possibility there is no way we can 
translate the tangle of variables to each other, that some variables in ecology are 
Incommensurable. All these issues result from having no general framework from 
which to relate the different variables in ecology. 
3.1 TOWER OF BABEL
The Tower of Babel problem is well known by ecologists (e.g., Grimm and Wissel 
1997; Herrando- Pérez et al. 2012). It is where the terminology used to describe 
ecological phenomena is so inflated and inconsistent it is difficult to parse the 
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relationships of the concepts and scientific variables used in ecological research. 
This may not seem significant to some philosophers, as they might conclude that 
there is still some ideal way for these terms to be related if we are given time to find 
it, but it is immensely impactful to practicing scientists (Trombley and Cottenie 
2019). I explain why terminological convergence and variable consistency aids sci-
entific progress. Consistency is often a forced byproduct of having to relate each 
lower- level theory to the general theory that subsumes them. 
 For each of the important variables in ecology we find a proliferation of simi-
larly referring terms. Terms such as ‘ecological community’, ‘ecological function’, 
‘invasive species’, ‘biodiversity’, and ‘niche’ all have a wide range of interpreta-
tions through the science. In an extended consideration of the concept density- 
dependency, Herrando- Pérez et al. (2012) identify several different manners in 
which the lexicon is counterproductively inflated.7 Term inflation can include 
synonymy, where two words refer to the same thing. For example, the observation 
that increasing population size results in the slowing of population growth has 
been referred to as ‘centripetality’, ‘compensation’, and ‘disoperation’. Such a prob-
lem can be addressed by convention, if we can bring all parties into agreement. A 
more difficult issue is when terms differ slightly but not substantially. This can be 
due to differing interpretations of the theoretical justification of the terms mean-
ing or the revision of the term so that it includes more phenomena the researcher 
considers explanatorily important. This results in multiple terms that partially 
co- refer. Partial co- reference yields problems in partitioning causal influence, as 
discussed below, but beyond that it leads to considerable confusion about what 
phenomena has been explained. A general theory, which each of these terms need 
to be related, allows for a common language that new variables must be coherent 
with and allows for consistent meaning across a science. 
 Inconsistent and difficult to parse terminology holds back the education of 
the next generation of ecologists. When students and early career researcher try to 
understand concepts, concepts that experts reasonably disagree on, the lack of clar-
ity puts a barrier to understanding the difficult theoretical terms that populate the 
science. This does not just impede the speed at which experts can be trained; some 
within the field may avoid research which deploy such byzantine terminology. 
This in the long term will influence the scope of ecological research and can drive 
the turn to studying individual populations, or narrow research domains, rather 
than broader more theoretical hypotheses. This is a different type of problem than 
what are usually considered by philosophers. The lack of unifying explanations is 
creating a practical problem: it prevents scientists from identifying a framework 
that can aid in organizing the terminology. Instead convergence is case by case 
and requires difficult negotiations between relevant scientific parties as they lack a 
 7. The ideas in this paper are expanded and clarified in the following blog post by the coauthor 
Corey Bradshaw. https://conservationbytes.com/2012/09/17/ecology- tower- babel/ (accessed 
February 8, 2019).
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common worldview. The science through a lack of an epistemic resource, a unify-
ing framework for their target phenomena, is practically impeded. 
3.2 (PARTIAL) PARTITIONING OF CAUSES
The differing local theoretical frameworks can result in many sets of variables, 
which extensionally overlap or partially overlap. When we want to relate these 
local laws, or models, we need to identify how the variables in each law causally or 
constitutionally relate to each other. The process of identifying these relations can 
be extremely difficult. Decisions must be made about what general framework is 
used to relate all these differing lower- level theories. A general theory of ecological 
communities would provide a series of variables which lower- level theories would 
relate to creating a common causal and constitutional framework. I believe that 
there is a real problem with just building a science from the ground up without any 
consistency in the variables used. 
 The importance of variable consistency can be seen when we incorporate 
ceteris paribus conditions or integrate different laws on a single target phenome-
non. Colyvan and Ginzburg (2003) describe the Galilean law of freefall, in which 
large bodies all fall at constant acceleration irrespective of their mass. This is a 
well- established law of physics, but it has well- known exceptions. Snowflakes have 
radically different rates of acceleration than hailstones. This is due to the ceteris 
paribus condition of friction, which is derived from Newtonian mechanics. When 
these two laws are integrated, to explain the difference between the phenomena 
of snowflakes and hailstones falling, we need to identify their differential effect 
on the target phenomena, the acceleration of these bodies. Both laws can have 
their causal influence partitioned in their effect on single target variable. This is 
required for integrating causal relations derived from separate laws. 
 The partial co- reference of variables to the same system results in problems 
when we attempt to integrate different laws. Local laws, which display causal rela-
tionships between variables, will eventually need to be related to each other to gain 
a comprehensive picture of how ecological systems are arranged and maintained. 
We need to identify whether the local laws just redescribe the same phenomena 
(and the relationship between variables) in different local laws. When different 
laws describe variables that partially refer to the same referent we will have a prob-
lem when we amalgamate the causal information contained in these laws. For 
example, Law X describes the conditional relationship A causes B, Law Y describes 
the relationship C causes B*, where B and B* partially refer to each other. When 
we want to unify the science, we need to decide what the dependent variable is in 
the natural system we want to explain, B or B*. When settling on either variable, 
or a third compromise variable, there will be difficulty in identifying how much A 
and C influence the dependent variable due to the partial reference. It may require 
a whole new set of research to identify the relationship between these variables, 
slowing down progress and impeding our ability to infer the impact of lower- level 
laws on each other. These impacts could act as background conditions for other 
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laws, which explain why certain laws have the general domain they do. As such, 
having the ability to identify the network of causal interactions between local laws 
is crucial for scientific understanding. 
3.3 INCOMMENSURABILITY
The distinct carving of ecological variables might be untroubling, in the ideal, if 
these variables could be translated from one variable set to another. This would 
involve finding systematic correlated relationships between the values in one vari-
able description and another. Translation between variable sets is, however, not 
possible if variable sets are incommensurable. In such cases there is no systematic 
way to translate the variables found in one theoretic description to another. For 
example, there is a clear relationship between the measures of an imperial mea-
surement 12- inch ruler and a metric 30- cm ruler but there is not a systematic 
relationship between the values of an imperial measurement 12- inch ruler and 
the Schmidt sting pain index. The incommensurability between the Schmidt sting 
pain index and a classroom ruler is acceptable because both apply to very different 
representational aims; one is to measure distance, the other the pain inflicted by 
insect (Hymenoptera) stings. Community ecology suffers from a lack of commen-
surability internal to its own field, to features with similar representational goals. 
This causes problems for integrating lower- level laws in ecology as the variables in 
one model, or local law may not be able to be translated into the other.
 The problems I am describing in community ecology have been previously 
ascribed to a narrower domain of microbial ecology by Inkpen et al. (2017). They 
focus on the problem of functional measures in microbial ecology and argue there 
is no systematic way to distinguish functional types in an ecological setting. This 
fear about functional measures has been voiced in macroecology with Mlambo 
(2014, 781) stating loose definitions of function result “in an unfortunate view 
of functional diversity as a combination of any available morphological, physio-
logical and life- history traits.” This ultimately makes function incommensurable 
with taxonomic variables (often measured through phylogenetic diversity) as what 
counts as a function is highly disjunctive. This coheres with a growing body of lit-
erature, which show a lack of a clear relationship between these measures (Devictor 
et al. 2010; Mazel et al. 2018). There can be correlations, but these will be partial 
and interestingly asymmetrical; taxonomy may predict function while function is 
inaccurate at predicting taxonomy. I would, however, restrict this worry to func-
tional measures that describe morphological or physiological traits rather than 
function in the sense of cycling a type of resource. Resource cycling is a more mul-
tiply realizable trait and can appear in many more varied contexts, and this allows 
it to avoid incommensurability with other traits. 
 Incommensurability between phylogeny and morphological function mat-
ters because both the measures have similar representational aims, describing the 
diversity of populations in an ecological setting. Functional measures are gener-
ally local to limited sets of species, rather than the majority of life, and functional 
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measures are highly disjunctive, sharing little in common, so there can be no con-
sistent relationship between function and taxonomy. The disjunctive nature of 
function through life explains the incommensurability between it and phylogeny. 
Some critics have argued against using phylogenetic measures of diversity because 
they do not accurately correlate with function, and function connects better to 
ecosystem service (Winter, Devictor, and Schweiger 2013). Other argue the wider 
representational scope of phylogenetic measure makes them preferable as a gen-
eral measure of diversity (Lean 2017). Both sides aim for a convergence on key 
measures of diversity to integrate the ecological research being produced and aid 
conservation practice. Given the lack of consistent translation between function 
and taxonomy, be it species taxonomy or phylogenetic relations, these measures 
are incommensurable along the entire set values these variable sets take. There 
cannot be a single set of bridging laws that explains the relationship between these 
two measures.
 Incommensurability can result from having variables uniquely individuated 
by many different scientists and different conceptual schemas. Invasive species are 
alleged to be examples of this. The category is famously underdetermined with no 
consistent usage; what counts as an invasive species from one study to another can 
differ widely (Rejmánek et al. 2002). There seems to be no clear biological properties 
underlying ‘invasive species’ which would allow for a translation of invasive species 
to some sort of functional biological variable (Sagoff 2005). Incommensurability, 
as a result, pervades community ecology and extrapolating from one study design to 
another varies from extremely difficult to near impossible. 
 This all comes to a head in attempting to explain an ecological community’s 
composition, what explains the current distribution and abundance of popula-
tions. To explain a community, we need to partition up the unique causal influ-
ences that affect the community into discrete causes that can account for all the 
variation. We need to know why certain resilient laws appear to be robust over 
some background conditions and not others. A cacophony of non- discretely par-
titioned and incommensurable variables cannot be adequate for explanation. For 
a complete theory we need a general account of ecological arrangement, in which 
the variables can be partitioned so the lower- level laws can be related. This would 
allow for a consistent science of ecological communities, which can allow for stud-
ies across the science to be relatable. 
4. A RECENT PROPOSAL
General Unificatory Theories never left ecology after the panic over whether ecol-
ogy possessed laws of nature. A recent development is Mark Vellend’s descrip-
tion of community ecology being governed by four higher- level processes in his 
book The Theory of Ecological Communities (2016). He defends the need for a gen-
eral and coherent picture of ecological communities. This theory uses a general 
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description of ecological community phenomena that is consistent in its variables, 
economical, and largely complete. This is not to say that it is correct, there is a 
way to go to establish that, and I think there remains significant problems with 
Vellend’s proposal. However, this theory is a major development and an exemplar 
of how a general theory organizes the local models and causal inferences, with 
disparate variables, into a single framework. This aim, to unify lower- level theories 
into a single general theory, is also explicitly Vellend’s aim. 
 In a series of papers and later a book Vellend argues that community ecology 
can be viewed as analogous to population genetics (Vellend 2010; 2016; Vellend 
and Orrock 2009). Both sciences aim to explain patterns of distribution and abun-
dance. In population genetics it is the arrangement of genetic characters in a popu-
lation, while in ecology it is the arrangement of organism types in a community. 
Population genetics explains the arrangement of genetic characters in a population 
through the higher- level processes of selection within species, drift, gene flow, and 
mutation. These processes are not described by single causal structures or mathe-
matical pattern. They are explained through many lower- level causal relations and 
represented by families of mathematic models. But they are unified at the higher 
level through general processes that describe how varietals move in a population.
 The theory of ecological communities posits ecological communities are 
arranged by the following forces: selection among species, drift, dispersal, and spe-
ciation. These are analogues of the four central processes in population genetics— 
selection within species, drift, gene flow, and mutation. Whereas the target variables 
of population genetics are the change in allele types, the target variables of com-
munity ecology are the change in species types. The selection between species has 
been well studied and much of what was historically described as ‘traditional com-
munity ecology’ by authors including Lawton focused nearly entirely on selective 
forces between species types (Brown 1995; Lawton 1999). Speciation involves the 
production of new species varieties, just as mutation produces new varietals in 
genetics. Macroecologists have emphasized the influence of speciation of local 
community organization (Brown 1995; Ricklefs 1987). Drift incorporates the sto-
chastic aspect of birth, death, and mating; as such, this theory includes probabilis-
tic influences on the arrangement of species. The final process is dispersal, which 
accounts for how species move across a landscape, which is heavily influenced by 
metacommunity structure and the scale of the community. 
 This framework is aimed to be comprehensive, with Vellend stating “despite 
the overwhelmingly large number of mechanisms thought to underpin patterns in 
ecological communities, all such mechanisms involve only four distinct kinds of processes: 
selection, drift, speciation, and dispersal” (Vellend 2010, 183). Through maintaining 
a single set of target variables, the distribution of organisms as typed through spe-
cies, and having an exclusive set of forces, Vellend provides a general and unifica-
tory theory. The target variables of lower- level laws should be translated into these 
higher- level forces to create a unified science. All ecological communities have 
their composition determined by different degrees of these forces. This theory is 
PhilosophicalTopics47-1_i-iv_1-238.indd   138 9/11/20   10:11 AM
139
both economical, and hopefully explanatorily complete, avoiding the pitfalls of 
having numerous laws without a clear sense of their relationship.
 Vellend explicitly describes his theory as an attempt to unify local community 
phenomena under a set of higher- level processes. To show how this theory unifies 
community ecology under higher- level processes Vellend utilizes Elliot Sober’s 
(1991; 2000) discussion of natural selection. Sober argues that natural selection 
buys its generality through abstracting away all the causes of fitness differences. 
These causes can be explained by lower- level laws. Instead, it is a theory of the con-
sequences of fitness differences. This act of abstraction unites the different causes 
that contribute to fitness and provides an explanatory schematic that applies across 
biology. Vellend aims to do likewise, focusing on the distribution and abundance 
of organism types that are the product of ecological processes. 
 This act of abstraction removes the messiness Vellend, and I, contends exists 
in ecological theory. He argues current ecological theory is a laundry list of pat-
terns, lower- level processes, higher- level processes, and the numerous different 
ecological kinds. By creating a general explanatory schema, built around higher- 
level processes, he aims to unite the many lower- level generalizations into a single 
framework. This provides an explanatory schema and structures the observa-
tions and inferences we make about communities. The invariant generalizations 
described by both Colyvan and Ginzburg (2003) and Linquist et al. (2016) can be 
described within this framework as lower- level processes, which contribute to the 
higher- level processes described by Vellend (2016). For example, the lower- level 
law, “the impact of grazers on prey biomass decreases in proportion to species 
richness of prey communities,” is incorporated into the higher- level processes of 
ecological selection (Linquist et al. 2016).
 Describing selection as just one of the four processes involved in community 
ecology laws helps explain the problems with Lawton’s (1999) view of community 
laws. He was just too narrow in what should count as a law in community ecology, 
relegating too much variation to background conditions. When Lawton describes 
community ecology, he only counts local populations and their interactions as 
being in the scope of community ecology, not metacommunity dynamics such 
as migration between communities, which are treated as background conditions. 
One way to interpret the failure of local community ecology is there are few robust 
local relationships given variation in the metacommunity dynamics. All these other 
factors are included within the Vellend framework.
 Now I am not defending the ‘theory of community ecology’ as being correct. 
There will be difficulty implementing these four axes. Other grand theories like 
Thomas Schoener’s (1986), which had 12 axes in a n- dimensional hyperspace to 
explain community assemblage, could not be implemented due the complexity 
and contingency of the different axes (Lawton 1999). Some believe ecology’s causal 
heterogeneity means that general laws cannot ever be found (Elliott- Graves 2018). 
 Another worry is that the expanandum of ‘the science’ is not worthy of gen-
eral unifying theories. The domain of a unifying explanation is partially derived 
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from the epistemic aims of a science. As I described earlier a unifying explanation 
for community ecology would have explanatory power for the entirety of an eco-
logical community. There could be the possibility that explanation in community 
ecology is a problem because ecological communities do not exist (Ricklefs 2008; 
Shrader- Frechette and McCoy 1994, 110). If true one could interpret the fracturing 
of the science into piecemeal explanation which don’t easily relate is the explication 
of the science into more apt sciences as they have better defined target systems. This 
style of argument has some force which needs to be mitigated and I have defended 
the explanatory value of ecological communities previously (Lean 2018). 
 But such issues, among others, do not diminish the interesting contribution to 
ecological theory, and laws of nature, presented by Vellend (2016). He provides a 
comprehensive and explicit attempt to unify lower- level ecological laws into a gen-
eral higher- level explanatory framework, which deserves further consideration.
5. CONCLUSION
The science of community ecology lacks explanatory integration. The variables and 
laws described in the many different local laws do not easily integrate with the other 
local laws. This is because ecological variables are inconsistent and incommensu rable. 
Without a higher- level theory to organize the lower- level explanations we will struggle 
to provide comprehensive explanations of ecological phenomena. Some ecolo gists, 
particularly Mark Vellend, realize this and are actively attempting to address these 
issues by presenting a general theory of ecological communities (Vellend 2016). 
Philosophers should pay attention to these developments as they provide insight 
into scientific explanation and the historical debates around laws in ecology.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First I would like to thank my reviewers for the helpful feedback. Particular thanks 
goes to Stefan Linquist, who provided enthusiastic and insightful criticism. Cheers 
to Mark Colyvan, Ross Pain, and Matt Spike as well. The views expressed in this paper 
do not reflect on theirs. Work on this paper was supported by an Australian Research 
Council Discovery Grant (grant number DP170104924).
REFERENCES
Batterman, R. W., and C. C. Rice. 2014. “Minimal Model Explanations.” Philosophy of Science 81(3): 
349–76.
Bradshaw, C. J. A. 2012, September 17. “Ecology Is a Tower of Babel.” Retrieved August 2, 2019, from 
ConservationBytes.com website: https://conservationbytes.com/2012/09/17/ecology- tower- babel/.
PhilosophicalTopics47-1_i-iv_1-238.indd   140 9/11/20   10:11 AM
141
Brown, J. H. 1995. Macroecology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cartwright, N. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chase, J. M., and M. A. Leibold. 2003. Ecological Niches: Linking Classical and Contemporary Approaches. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Colyvan, M., and L. R. Ginzburg. 2003. “Laws of Nature and Laws of Ecology.” Oikos 101(3): 649–53.
Cooper, G. 1998. “Generalizations in Ecology: A Philosophical Taxonomy.” Biology and Philosophy 
13(4): 555–86.
Craver, C. F. 2007. Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Devictor, V., D. Mouillot, C. Meynard, F. Jiguet, W. Thuiller, and N. Mouquet. 2010. “Spatial Mismatch 
and Congruence between Taxonomic, Phylogenetic and Functional Diversity: The Need for 
Integrative Conservation Strategies in a Changing World.” Ecology Letters 13(8): 1030–40.
Elliott- Graves, A. 2018. “Generality and Causal Interdependence in Ecology.” Philosophy of Science 
85(5): 1102–14.
Elton, C. S. 1927. Animal Ecology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ginzburg, L., and M. Colyvan. 2004. Ecological Orbits: How Planets Move and Populations Grow. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grimm, V., and C. Wissel. 1997. “Babel, or the Ecological Stability Discussions: An Inventory and 
Analysis of Terminology and a Guide for Avoiding Confusion.” Oecologia 109(3): 323–34.
Herrando- Pérez, S., S. Delean, B. W. Brook, and C. J. A. Bradshaw. 2012. “Density Dependence: An 
Ecological Tower of Babel.” Oecologia 170(3): 585–603. 
Hutchinson, G. E. 1957. “Concluding Remarks.” Population Studies: Animal Ecology and Demography. 
Cold Springs Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology (22): 415–27.
Inkpen, S. A., G. M. Douglas, T. D. P. Brunet, K. Leuschen, W. F. Doolittle, and M. G. Langille. 2017. 
“The Coupling of Taxonomy and Function in Microbiomes.” Biology & Philosophy 32(6): 1225–43.
Kingsland, S. E. 1985. Modeling Nature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kitcher, P. 1981. “Explanatory Unification.” Philosophy of Science 48(4): 507–31.
Lange, M. 2005. “Ecological Laws: What Would They Be and Why Would They Matter?” Oikos 110(2): 
394–403.
Lawton, J. H. 1999. “Are There General Laws in Ecology?” Oikos 84(2): 177–192. 
Lean, C. H. 2017. “Biodiversity Realism: Preserving the Tree of Life.” Biology & Philosophy 32(6): 
1083–1103.
Lean, C. H. 2018. “Indexically Structured Ecological Communities.” Philosophy of Science 85(3): 
501–22.
Linquist, S. 2015. “Against Lawton’s Contingency Thesis; or, Why the Reported Demise of Community 
Ecology Is Greatly Exaggerated.” Philosophy of Science 82(5): 1104–15. 
Linquist, S., T. R. Gregory, T. A. Elliott, B. Saylor, S. C. Kremer, and K. Cottenie. 2016. “Yes! There Are 
Resilient Generalizations (or ‘Laws’) in Ecology.” Quarterly Review of Biology 91(2): 119–31. 
MacArthur, R. H. 1958. “Population Ecology of Some Warblers of Northeastern Coniferous Forests.” 
Ecology 39(4): 599–619.
MacArthur, R., and R. Levins. 1967. “The Limiting Similarity, Convergence, and Divergence of 
Coexisting Species.” American Naturalist 101(921): 377–85.
Mazel, F., M. W. Pennell, M. W. Cadotte, S. Diaz, G. V. Dalla Riva, R. Grenyer, C. M. Tucker, et al. 
2018. “Prioritizing Phylogenetic Diversity Captures Functional Diversity Unreliably.” Nature 
Communications 9(1): 2888.
Mitchell, S. D. 2000. “Dimensions of Scientific Law.” Philosophy of Science 67(2): 242–65.
Mlambo, M. C. 2014. “Not All Traits Are ‘Functional’: Insights from Taxonomy and Biodiversity- 
Ecosystem Functioning Research.” Biodiversity and Conservation 23(3): 781–90.
Peters, R. H. 1991. A Critique for Ecology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rejmánek, M., D. M. Richardson, M. G. Barbour, M. J. Crawley, G. F. Hrusa, P. B. Moyle, M. Williamson, 
et al. 2002. “Biological Invasions: Politics and the Discontinuity of Ecological Terminology.” 
Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America 83(2): 131–33.
Ricklefs, R. E. 1987. “Community Diversity: Relative Roles of Local and Regional Processes.” Science 
235(4785): 167–71.
Ricklefs, R. E. 2008. “Disintegration of the Ecological Community.” American Naturalist 172(6): 
741–50. 
Roughgarden, J. 2009. “Is There a General Theory of Community Ecology?” Biology & Philosophy 
24(4): 521–29.
PhilosophicalTopics47-1_i-iv_1-238.indd   141 9/11/20   10:11 AM
142
Roughgarden, J. 1989. “The Structure and Assembly of Communities.” In Perspectives in Ecological 
Theory, edited by Roughgarden J, May RM, Levin SA, pp 203–226. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press
Sagoff, M. 2005. “Do Non- native Species Threaten the Natural Environment?” Journal of Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics 18(3): 215–36.
Schoener, T. W. 1986. “Overview: Kinds of Ecological Communities: Ecology Becomes Pluralistic.” 
In Community Ecology, edited by J. M. Diamond and T. J. Case, pp. 467–79. New York: Harper 
and Row.
Shrader- Frechette, K. S., and E. D. McCoy. 1990. “Theory Reduction and Explanation in Ecology.” 
Oikos 58(1): 109–114. 
Shrader- Frechette, K. S., and E. D. McCoy. 1993. Method in Ecology: Strategies for Conservation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shrader- Frechette, K. S., and E. D. McCoy. 1994. “How the Tail Wags the Dog: How Value Judgments 
Determine Ecological Science.” Environmental Values 3(2): 107–20.
Skyrms, B. 1980. Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Smart, J. J. C. 1959. “Can Biology Be an Exact Science?” Synthese 11(4): 359–68.
Smart, J. J. C. 1963. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge.
Sober, E. 2000. Philosophy of Biology (2nd ed., vol. 85). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Sober, E. 1991. “Models of Cultural Evolution.” In Trees of Life: Essays in the Philosophy of Biology, 
edited by P. E. Griffiths, pp. 17–38. New York: Kluwer.
Trombley, C. A., and K. Cottenie. 2019. “Quantifying the Scientific Cost of Ambiguous Terminology 
in Community Ecology.” Philosophical Topics (this volume). 
Turchin, P. 2001. “Does Population Ecology Have General Laws?” Oikos 94(1): 17–26.
Vellend, M. 2010. “Conceptual Synthesis in Community Ecology.” Quarterly Review of Biology 85(2): 
183–206.
Vellend, M. 2016. The Theory of Ecological Communities (Vol. 75). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Vellend, M., and J. L. Orrock. 2009. “Ecological and Genetic Models of Diversity: Lessons across 
Disciplines.” In The Theory of Island Biogeography Revisited, edited by J. B. Losos and R. E. Ricklefs, 
pp. 439–61. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wayne, A. 2018. “Explanatory Integration.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8(3): 347–65.
Weisberg, M. 2013. Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Winter, M., V. Devictor, and O. Schweiger. 2013. “Phylogenetic Diversity and Nature Conservation: 
Where Are We?” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 28(4): 199–204.
Woodward, J. 2005. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Woodward, J. 2017. “Scientific Explanation.” In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2017). Retrieved on December 2, 2019, from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017 
/entries/scientific- explanation/. 
Woodward, J. 1997. “Explanation, Invariance, and Intervention.” Philosophy of Science 64:S26–S41.
PhilosophicalTopics47-1_i-iv_1-238.indd   142 9/11/20   10:11 AM
